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ABSTRACT 
 
[1]  The question of whether software programs embodying patented 
processes need to be marked in accordance with the marking requirement 
as set forth under 35 U.S.C. § 287 is an unanswered issue.  This article 
first analyzes the marking requirement in the United States patent system 
and then goes on to survey the rocky history of patents on software 
innovations.  After noting that neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal 
Circuit has directly decided the issue of the applicability of the Marking 
Statute to software programs, the article analyzes recent federal district 
court and Federal Circuit cases, ultimately reasoning that the Federal 
Circuit would likely conclude that software programs embodying patented 
processes need to comply with the marking requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 
287.   Finally, the article concludes by discussing the ramifications of the 
Marking Statute to software patents and the software industry. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[2]  Since 1842, within the United States, there has been a statutory 
requirement that all patented articles be marked in such a way as to alert 
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the public of such patent protection (the “Marking Requirement”).1  As 
the Federal Circuit has explained, the Marking Requirement serves to put 
the public on notice that a product is patented in order to avoid innocent 
infringement.2  Under current patent law, the Marking Requirement is 
prescribed by 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (the “Marking Statute”).  Failure to mark 
a “patented article” creates a bar to a patentee in collecting damages from 
an infringer.3
 
[3]  The Marking Requirement is not imposed under two scenarios:  (1) 
where no patented article has been produced by a patentee or its licensee 
(and thus there is no product to mark); and (2) where a patent is a pure 
process or method patent (i.e., again, where there is no product to mark).4  
While these exceptions to the Marking Requirement are well established 
in case law, the question of whether programs embodying software patents 
need to meet the Marking Requirement remains unanswered.  With respect 
to the Marking Requirement, software patents5 present an interesting grey 
area, as many software patents are comprised of process claims6 that are 
not necessarily tangible.  This article analyzes the Marking Requirement, 
explores the history of patents on software-related innovations, and seeks 
to address the question of whether software programs embodying patented 
software processes need to be marked in accordance with the Marking 
Requirement. 
                                               
1 See Wine R. Appliance Co. v. Enter. R. Equip., 297 U.S. 387, 390 (1936) (describing 
the Act of August 29, 1842, which required patentees to mark their patented articles and 
penalized those who did not). 
2 Nike, Inc. v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that 
the Marking Statute serves three purposes:  (1) “helping to avoid innocent infringement”; 
(2) “encouraging patentees to give notice to the public that the article is patented”; and 
(3) “aiding the public to identify whether an article is patented”) (citations omitted). 
3 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000). 
4 Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 906 F. Supp. 813, 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(citing Bandag Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir.1983)). 
5 Throughout this article, the phrase “software patent” will be used generically to refer to 
any patented innovations that can be embodied in software.  The United States Patent and 
Trademark Office refer to software patents as “patents on computer-related inventions.”  
See, e.g., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (the “MPEP”) § 2106 
(Rev. 2, May 2004) (explaining that some patents that can be effectuated in software do 
not necessarily mention software on the face of the patent application or issued patent).   
6 Throughout this article, the phrase “process claims” will be used to mean both process 
claims and method claims. 
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II. THE MARKING STATUTE 
 
[4]  To date, neither the Federal Circuit nor any federal district court has 
ruled whether the Marking Statute creates a bar to recovery of damages in 
an instance where a software program, embodying one or more software 
patents, is unmarked.7
 
[5]  The Marking Statute imposes limitations on the recovery of damages 
in a successful patent infringement action.8  In order for patentees to be in 
a position to collect full statutorily recoverable damages, the requirements 
of the Marking Statute must be met.9  Failure to mark a patented article as 
mandated in the statute can lead to a dramatic reduction of recoverable 
damages by a patentee.  The Federal Circuit has held that the Marking 
Requirement is a statutory duty requiring a patent holder to give “in rem 
notice to the world,” and that without such notice (i.e., without proper 
marking) a plaintiff may not recover its full damages.10
 
A.  BASICS OF THE MARKETING STATUTE 
 
[6]  The basic requirement of the Marking Statute is that patentees must 
“mark” their “patented article[s]” offered for sale within the United 
States.11  To comply with the Marking Requirement, it is necessary to give 
notice of an article’s patented status either by including the “word ‘patent’ 
or the abbreviation ‘pat.’, together with the number of the patent” on the 
article itself; or, where not feasible, such notice can be contained on the 
article’s packaging.12  
 
                                               
7 E.g., Stephen Lindholm, Marking the Software Patent Beast 30 (Jan. 1, 2005) 
(unpublished paper, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=642123) (indicating that the Federal 
Circuit has not decided whether software patents need be marked). 
8 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2000) (stating that the patentee can seek, in addition to damages, an 
infringer’s profits); Nike, 138 F.3d at 1446 (holding that in addition to limiting damages, 
a failure to mark also limits recovery of such profits). 
9 § 289. 
10 Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing 
Hazeltine Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 20 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1937)). 
11 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000). 
12 Id. 
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[7]  The Marking Statute prevents recovery of damages unless the 
infringer was on notice, either constructive or actual, that the infringed 
article was protected by a valid United States patent.13  If the infringed 
patented article was marked in accordance with the Marking Statute, then, 
the infringer is constructively deemed to be on notice of the article’s 
patented status.14  Consequently, compliance with the Marking Statute 
acts, irrefutably, to “place the world on notice” that an article is protected 
by a patent.15  In the absence of appropriate marking, a patentee’s 
recovery is limited to those damages that occurred after the patentee 
actually places the infringer on notice of the alleged infringement.16
 
B. THE FAILURE TO MARK 
 
[8]  The failure of a party to mark their product in accordance with the 
Marking Statute results in an absolute inability to recover for infringement 
damages by another party except for those damages that occurred after the 
infringing party was placed on notice by the patentee of the 
infringement.17  A failure to comply with the Marking Statute places the 
burden on the patentee to prove that the infringer was made aware of the 
potential infringement by the patentee.18 In the absence of marking, the 
requirement of actual notice ensures two things: (1) that infringers are 
                                               
13 Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting SRI Int’l, Inc. v. 
Advanced Tech. Labs, Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
14 Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1537 n.18. 
15 Id. at 1538 (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 806 F. Supp. 1294, 1296 
(E.D. La. 1992)). 
16 Amsted Indus. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(holding that, in the absence of marking, “notice must be of the infringement, not merely 
notice of the patent's existence or ownership”) (internal quotations omitted); Am. Med. 
Sys., 6 F.3d at 1536 (stating that liability for infringement of a product subject to the 
Marking Requirement of § 287 occurs either from such time as the product was marked 
as required by the statute or upon actual notice to the infringer of infringement by the 
patentee).  In many cases, such actual notice does not occur until a patent infringement 
suit is filed. 
17 Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1535.   
18 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000) (“In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be 
recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the 
infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter. . .”);  see 
also Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1537 n.18 (“The notice of the infringement therefore must 
come from the patentee, not the infringer.” (quoting Devices for Medicine, Inc. v. Boehl, 
822 F.2d 1062, 1066 (Fed. Cir.1987)). 
 4
 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue1 
aware that their activity is infringing; and (2) that liability for such 
infringement fails to accrue until such time as the patentee makes any 
infringers aware of the infringement.19
[9]  The Federal Circuit has held that the duty to mark is proactive to the 
patent holder and is irrespective of the knowledge of an alleged 
infringer.20  Consequently, whether an infringer knows that an article is 
protected by a patent is immaterial; what is material is the moment in time 
that the infringer was put on notice by the patentee that the infringer’s 
product infringes.21  Thus, it is not enough that an infringer knows that a 
product is covered by a valid patent; rather, the patent holder must put the 
alleged infringer on notice of the infringement, either by complying with 
the Marking Requirement or by informing the infringer of the potential 
infringement.22  Additionally, the Federal Circuit has held that in order for 
marking to satisfy the Marking Statute, “it must be substantially consistent 
and continuous” such that a party who only occasionally and intermittently 
complied with the Marking Requirement would be in no better shape than 
would a patent holder who had not complied at all.23   
 
[10]  The burden of proving compliance with the Marking Statute rests 
with the patentee.24  In the situation where a patentee has licensed the 
right to produce the patented product to third parties, the obligation to 
ensure compliance with the Marking Statute remains with the patentee.25  
However, in such a case, a patentee’s compliance will be judged on 
whether the patentee took reasonable steps to ensure compliance and not 
necessarily whether actual compliance was achieved.26  Thus, in the case 
where a third party fails to mark, the Marking Statute will not prove a bar 
to recovery if a patentee demonstrates that reasonable steps were taken to 
ensure compliance with the Marking Statute regardless of whether a third 
party licensee fully complied with the statute.  
 
                                               
19 SRI Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Lab., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
20 Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1344, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Amsted Indus., 24 
F.3d at 187). 
21 Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1537. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 1111-12. 
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C. LACK OF A TANGIBLE ARTICLE 
 
[11]  However, in cases where there is no product to mark, the Marking 
Statute provides no bar to recovery of damages.27  Thus, the Marking 
Requirement is only necessary “in connection with some fabricated 
article.”28
 
[12]  When the allegedly infringing product is made using a patented 
process, it is well established that the Marking Requirement does not 
affect the calculus of damages.29  With respect to such patents, the Federal 
Circuit has informed that “[t]he reason that the [M]arking [S]tatute does 
not apply to [process] claims is that, ordinarily, where the patent claims 
are directed to only a method or process[,] there is nothing to mark.”30  
However, where the patent consists of both apparatus and process claims, 
the Marking Requirement is operable, at least to the extent that a tangible 
product exists.31
 
[13]  As a result, there are at least two potential arguments to justify 
excluding software covered by one or more patents from the Marking 
Requirement:  (1) that since software is not a tangible product, there is no 
product required to be marked; and (2) that since the Federal Circuit has 
indicated that products produced by pure process claims need not be 
marked, software covered by process claims need not adhere to the 
requirements of the Marking Statute.  As discussed below, the analysis of 
these arguments is not dispositive, and given the lack of judicial 
pronouncements on this issue, it remains an unanswered question as to 
                                               
27 Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing 
Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 393 (1936)). 
28 Id. (quoting Wine Ry. Appliance, 297 U.S. at 395). 
29 State Contracting & Eng’g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (quoting Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., Inc., 704 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1983)). 
30 Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
31 State Contracting, 346 F.3d 1057 at 1074 (quoting Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1538). 
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whether a software program that embodies one or more software patents 
needs to adhere to the requirements of the Marking Statute. 
 
 
III.  SOFTWARE PATENTS 
 
A. EARLY HISTORY OF SOFTWARE PATENTS 
 
[14]  The history of software patents in the United States is a rocky, 
convoluted one.  It has only been in the last approximately twenty-five 
years that software innovation has enjoyed patent protection and only 
since 1996 has the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) 
actually had guidelines for dealing with software patents.32  As recently as 
1966, a report of the President’s Commission on the Patent System 
proposed that computer programs be denied patent protection.33  
 
[15]  Generally speaking, in order for something to be eligible for patent 
protection, it must be useful (as required under 35 U.S.C. § 101); it must 
be novel (as detailed under 35 U.S.C. § 102); it must be “nonobvious” (as 
detailed under 35 U.S.C. § 103); and it must fit both a written description 
and enabling requirement (as detailed under 35 U.S.C. § 112).34  
However, most of the debate and controversy surrounding software 
patents in the United States has centered not on the question of whether a 
particular software innovation meets the statutory requirements of 
patentability, but rather on the threshold question of whether software 
innovations are the kind of which are protectable at all under federal 
patent law.35  Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, only a “process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter” can receive a patent.  It was under 
a holding that software innovations are not patentable subject matter (i.e., 
that software innovations are neither a process, machine, manufacture, nor 
                                               
32 See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 (Feb. 
28, 1996). 
33 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 197 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
34 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
35 See, e.g., Thomas P. Burke, Software Patent Protection: Debugging the Current 
System, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1115, 1142 (1994) (citing 35 U.S.C. §101 foundation 
patent requirements but questioning how, with thousands of software patents already 
issued, “the question [of] whether software per se can be patented is still hotly debated.”). 
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composition of matter) that the Supreme Court initially declared software 
innovations unpatentable. 
 
 
B. A PREMATURE END TO SOFTWARE PATENTS 
 
[16]  In 1972, the Supreme Court set down precedent effectively denying a 
mathematical algorithm protection under patent law.36  In Gottschalk v. 
Benson, the Court ruled that a patent application for an algorithm was 
properly denied by the PTO as not protectable subject matter. 37
 
[17]  As stated above, under U.S. patent law, any “process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter” is appropriate subject matter for 
patent protection.38  In Benson, the Court ruled that the software 
innovation in question was not protectable under patent law owing to a 
lack of patentable subject matter.39  In declining to characterize an 
algorithm as protectable subject matter, the Court relied on two 
fundamental precepts: (1) that an abstract idea, a law of nature, or a 
natural phenomenon is not patentable subject matter and (2) that a patent 
must have a definitive scope.40
 
[18]  Courts have long held that patents on abstract ideas, laws of nature, 
and natural phenomena are not patentable subject matter.41  In essence, the 
courts have made a distinction between mere discovery of that which 
                                               
36 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).  
37 Id. at 71-72.  The algorithm in question dealt with converting binary-coded decimal 
(“BCD”) notation into pure binary notation.  In BCD notion, each digit of a number is 
converted to its constituent notion in binary.  Thus the number 152 in BCD notion is 
represented as 0001 (for 1), 0101 (for 5), and 0010 (for 2).  In pure binary notion, the 
number 152 is represented as 010011000.  The ramifications of this algorithm amounted 
to a substantial increase in the speed at which computerized switches could route 
telephone calls.  For a more detailed explanation, see Benson, 409 U.S. at 65-67.   
38 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
39 Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72. 
40 Id. at 67-68. 
41 See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131-132 (1948) (holding that 
a discovery relating to the qualities of certain strains of naturally occurring bacteria is not 
patentable); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874) (“An idea of 
itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it may be made practically useful is.”). 
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already exists in nature and true invention.42  Consequently, Einstein 
would not have been able to patent his famous discovery that E=MC2,43 
but Edison was able to patent his invention of the carbon filament light 
bulb.44
 
[19]  Courts have also held that claims lacking definitive scope are 
unpatentable.45  According to the Court in Benson, a patent on the 
algorithm for converting BCD notation to pure binary notation could not 
be allowed as it would effectively grant the patentee the rights to all uses 
of such conversions, even if such uses have not yet been invented.46
 
[20]  In Benson, the Court went out of its way to explicitly state that it did 
not hold software, in and of itself, to be non-patentable subject matter;47 
nevertheless, its ruling was largely viewed as deterring patents on 
software.48  
C. SOFTWARE PATENT REVIVAL 
 
[21]  Benson’s chilling effect on software patents was ended in the early 
1980’s largely due to the influence of two Supreme Court cases.  In 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court overruled a PTO ruling and 
found that man-made micro-organisms were patentable such matter.49  In 
so concluding, the Court found that it was Congress’s intent in passing the 
1952 Patent Act, to provide patent protection for “anything under the sun 
                                               
42 E.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
43 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
44 U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (filed Jan 27, 1880). 
45 See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1854) (holding that a particular claim in 
Samuel Morse’s patent on the telegraph was void as it amounted to a claim on any 
method that used electric signals as a means of communication, even those which had not 
yet been invented). 
46 Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72. 
47 Id.. 
48 Burke, supra note 35, at 1144 (“Justice Douglas’ opinion in Gottschalk v. Benson 
virtually foreclosed the patentability of computer programs.”). 
49 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310; see also Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual 
Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, n.44 (2004) (stating that this 
case is widely heralded as jump-starting the biotechnology industry within the United 
States). 
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that is made by man.”50  While noting that “laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas” fall outside of this broad ambit, the Court 
made clear that what constitutes patentable subject matter is to be defined 
broadly.51   
 
[22]  The following year, the Court decided Diehr.52 In this case, the 
Court was required to determine whether a new method for curing 
synthetic rubber was patentable.53  Part of the claimed invention involved 
the use of a computer to repeatedly apply a well-known equation in order 
to dynamically calculate the proper heating time to cure a quantity of 
synthetic rubber.54  Sensors inside the molds would periodically report the 
temperature of the rubber, thus providing the necessary inputs for the 
equation.55  The PTO rejected the patent on the grounds that, as a 
computer program, the invention was not directed towards an invention of 
patentable subject matter.56  However, the Supreme Court overruled the 
PTO, and declared the invention patentable and held that software, at least 
under certain circumstances, was a patentable subject matter.57
 
[23]  It is notable that the Supreme Court was consistent in its 
pronouncements regarding the patentability of software innovations 
(namely that an algorithm is patentable subject matter so long as the 
algorithm only uses mathematical relationships to achieve its ends as 
opposed to trying to patent the mathematical relationships themselves).  
Yet, the result of these two cases on the allowability of software patents 
was profound.  Much as the Gottschalk decision had a chilling effecting 
on software patents, with Diehr, software patents began to enjoy a 
renaissance.  Today, there are over 100,000 issued software patents.58
 
D. DEFINING ALGORITHM 
                                               
50 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979 at 5 (1952), as reprinted in 
1952 U.S.C.A.N. 2394, 2399). 
51 Id. 
52 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
53 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177-78. 
54 Id. at 178-79. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 180. 
57 Id. at 193. 
58 Lindholm, supra note 7, at 3. 
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[24]  The difference between Benson and Diehr is the Court’s 
understanding of the definition of an algorithm.  In Benson, the Court, 
taking a narrow definition, recited the following explanation of an 
algorithm:   
 
A procedure for solving a given type of 
mathematical problem is known as an 
“algorithm.”  The procedures set forth in the 
present claim are of that kind; that is to say, 
they are a generalized formulation for 
programs to solve mathematical problems of 
converting one form of numerical 
representation to another.  From the generic 
formulation, programs may be developed as 
specific applications.59
 
Thus, under the Benson definition, an algorithm will not be patentable 
subject matter if it amounts to nothing more than an attempt to claim 
“math” as mathematics falls outside the scope of patentable subject 
matter.60
 
[25]  The Diehr Court, however, allowed a software patent to issue.  The 
Court distinguished itself from its prior decisions by making clear that 
where a mathematical formula is used as part of a process, even where the 
formula is well-known and, so long as the process itself is otherwise 
patentable, a patent may issue.61  The Court defined a process as:  
 
‘[A] mode of treatment of certain materials 
to produce a given result.  It is an act, or a 
series of acts, performed upon the subject-
matter to be transformed and reduced to a 
                                               
59 Benson, 409 U.S. at 65. 
60 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186 (explaining that the decision in Benson interprets an algorithm, 
like a mathematical formula, to be equivalent to a law of nature and therefore not of 
patentable subject matter). 
61 Id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or 
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent 
protection.”). 
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different state or thing.  If new and useful, it 
is just as patentable as is a piece of 
machinery.  In the language of patent law, it 
is an art.  The machinery pointed out as 
suitable to perform the process may or may 
not be new or patentable; whilst the process 
itself may be altogether new, and produce an 
entirely new result.  The process requires 
that certain things should be done with 
certain substances, and in a certain order; 
but the tools to be used in doing this may be 
of secondary consequence.62
[26]  Thus, in Diehr, the Court abandoned the notion that an algorithm is 
nothing but a representation of underlying unpatentable mathematics, and 
adopted a more expansive concept which allowed for the patenting of 
algorithms that produced a tangible result.  
 
E. FREEMAN-WALTER-ABELE TEST 
 
[27]  Concurrent with the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in 
Chakrabarty and Diehr, the lower courts developed a test to determine 
whether an algorithm was patentable or whether it was merely a 
nonpatentable mathematical process.  This test, generally referred to as the 
Freeman-Walter-Abele test,63 has two parts. First, an examining entity 
(such as the PTO or a court) should determine whether a mathematical 
algorithm is recited directly or indirectly by a claim.64  If recited directly, 
the second portion of the test is to determine whether the claim is directed 
to the algorithm (in which case it is not patentable subject matter) or if 
rather the claim merely uses the algorithm as part of its claimed process.65 
                                               
62 Id. at 182-83 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876)). 
63 The etymology of this semi-eponymous test can be traced over the course of three 
cases: In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 
(C.C.P.A. 1980); and In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
64 Arrythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 
1992). 
65 Id. 
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As the court explained in Arrythmia Research, “the emphasis is ‘on what 
the claimed method steps do rather than how the steps are performed.’”66  
 
[28]  However, it is clear that this test is no longer applicable to the 
patentability of software patents.  In the original guidelines promulgated 
by the PTO regarding the examination of computer-related inventions, 
patent examiners were informed that “[t]he Freeman-Walter-Abele test 
may additionally be relied upon in analyzing claims directed solely to a 
process for solving a mathematical algorithm.”67  Subsequent rulings by 
the Federal Circuit have informed that the rulings of Diehr and 
Chakrabarty have obviated the test with respect to its ability to determine 
patentability.68  Current PTO examiners are now informed that they 
should “no longer rely on the Freeman-Walter-Abele test to determine 
whether a claimed invention is directed to statutory subject matter.”69  
Instead, examiners are directed to ensure that the “claimed invention as a 
whole must accomplish a practical application.”70  
 
IV.  MUST SOFTWARE BE MARKED? 
 
A. CURRENT STATUS OF SOFTWARE PATENTS 
 
[29]  As indicated above, the notion of receiving a software patent has not 
always been a firmly established tenet of the United States patent system.  
In fact, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Diehr, most patents on 
software innovations were disguised in patent applications as being 
hardware innovations.71
 
[30]  The predominate early debate over patenting software innovations 
turned on the question of whether software was of patentable subject 
matter.72  Early cases, in part based on the rudimentary functionality of 
                                               
66 Id. (quoting Ex Parte Logan, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1465, 1468 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 
1991)) (emphases in original). 
67 Examination Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7479 (Feb. 28, 1996). 
68 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
69 MPEP § 2106. 
70 Id. 
71 Simson L. Garfinkel, Patently Absurd, 2.07 WIRED MAGAZINE., July 1994, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.07/patents_pr.html. 
72 See supra PART III. 
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software, held that software did not do anything other than perform 
mathematics, albeit very quickly and efficiently.73  Thus, owing to a 
proscription on the patenting of mathematical formulas, software was not 
deemed patentable subject matter.74
 
[31]  As the judicial interpretation of this issue began to evolve over the 
next decade, slowly, the notion that software was merely unpatentable 
mathematics and laws of nature changed.75  In Diehr, the Court allowed a 
patent on an invention, whose only innovative step was the use of a 
particular software process.76  In so doing, the Diehr court re-invigorated 
the notion that innovations in the field of computer software were 
patentable subject matter.77    
 
[32]  Over the course of the intervening years, the courts and the PTO 
increasingly warmed to the notion of patents on software innovations, and 
in 1996, the PTO promulgated guidelines for dealing with patents on such 
inventions (“PTO Guidelines”).78  Under the PTO Guidelines any claimed 
invention, computer-related or otherwise, must meet the requirements of 
35 U.S.C. § 101, including the requirements of utility,79 and the 
requirements of novelty80 and obviousness81 as well as meeting certain 
enabling and written description requirements.82  Whereas, for most 
claimed inventions, the utility requirement poses a low barrier to 
patentability,83 the PTO Guidelines require an examiner to pay special 
                                               
73 See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text. 
74 Id. 
75 See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text. 
76 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
77 See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. 
78 See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 (Feb. 
28, 1996), now embodied in § 2106 of the MPEP. 
79 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
80 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
81 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). 
82 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
83 Patent law’s requirement of utility has always been a relatively low bar to overcome.  
While the boundaries of this concept are hard to define, the patent office generally treats 
utility in a nominal fashion.  In general, utility must be something more substantive than, 
for example, “use of a complex invention as landfill.” See MPEP § 2107(II)(B)(1)(i).  
Most inventions will have some usefulness, and will find that the utility requirement 
poses little barrier to patentability.  
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attention to this requirement in the case of a computer-related invention.84  
While the confines of the utility requirement for computer-related 
inventions have yet to be fully defined by the courts, the PTO Guidelines 
make clear that utility of a computer-related invention must be something 
more than just data or information stored on a computer-readable medium.  
For example, a DVD movie is not patentable simply because it can be 
accessed by a computer and is therefore not patentable as “nonfunctional 
descriptive information.”  Other forms of “nonfunctional descriptive 
material” include music stored on a compact disc, books stored in a digital 
form, and any “compilation or mere arrangement of data.”85
 
[33]  The PTO instructs its examiners to “determine what the programmed 
computer does when it performs the process dictated by the software.”86  
The MPEP notes, quoting Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. 
Corazonix Corp.,87 that in making this determination, the examiner needs 
to look beyond the base distinction of how the computer performs its 
programmed function (i.e., manipulating binary data through mathematical 
operations) to what the computer is doing.88  Thus, the pre-Diehr 
conception that software merely performs mathematical algorithms and is, 
therefore, not patentable, has been expunged.  Examiners are required to 
look not at how the computer interprets the algorithm but at the results of 
the process. 
 
[34]  Bound to this determination is the question of whether the invention 
is of patentable subject matter.  While mindful of the Supreme Court’s 
determination in Chakrabarty that patentable subject matter should be 
treated with a fairly expansive scope, examiners are reminded that there 
are limits to what can be patented, and only that which is a machine, 
manufacture, composition of matter, or a process is patentable.89   
 
[35]  Software fits this statutory definition in one of two ways: either (1) 
as a pure process patent; or (2) as a mixed process and apparatus patent.  
                                               
84 MPEP § 2106(II)(A). 
85 MPEP § 2106(IV)(B)(1). 
86 MPEP § 2106 (II)(B). 
87 Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 
1992). 
88 MPEP § 2106 (II)(B). 
89 MPEP § 2106(IV)(A) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)). 
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In the latter case, the PTO will treat a general-function computer that is 
programmed with the software on which a patent is sought as the 
apparatus.90  Thus, where the patent contains both process and apparatus 
claims, the invention is a general-function computer (i.e., the apparatus) 
that is running certain software (i.e., processes that are contained in the 
software).  A computer program can be claimed as a pure process patent 
only in the instance where the “computer is executing the computer 
program’s instructions.”91
 
B. IS SOFTWARE A PATENTED ARTICLE 
 
[36]  The judiciary has not specified whether a program that embodies one 
or more software patents needs to be marked in accordance with the 
Marking Statute.92  The answer to this question depends on whether the 
judiciary will interpret software to be a “patented invention” under the 
Marking Statute.93
 
[37]  To date, the Federal Circuit has not addressed the meaning of the 
term “patented article” under the Marking Statute.94  However, as 
discussed below, several Federal Circuit (and federal district) court 
pronouncements relating to software patents indicate that were courts to 
consider whether programs that embody software patents need to be 
marked in accordance with the Marking Statute, they would likely hold in 
the affirmative. 
 
C. NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE INNOVATIONS 
 
[38]  In a recent case, Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal 
Circuit, upholding in part the lower court’s finding of infringement, 
determined affirmatively that software should be considered a “component 
                                               
90 A variant of this mixed apparatus and process exists where the computer program is 
claimed in conjunction with a physical structure such as a disk.  See AT&T Corp. v. 
Excel Commc’n, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994). 
91 MPEP § 2106(IV)(B)(1)(a). 
92 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000). 
93 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). 
94 § 287(a). 
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of a patented invention” as required under 35 U.S.C. § 271.95  In this case, 
the court had to grapple with the issue of whether copies of Microsoft’s 
Internet Explorer software that were physically created abroad, but used a 
master CD-ROM with the source code created in the United States, could 
be used in the calculus of infringement damages.  Ultimately, the court 
found that source code and master CD-ROM software constituted a 
component of a patented invention and could be used in calculating 
damages.96  In so ruling, the Federal Circuit concurred with the lower 
court on this issue, explaining that with respect to software innovations 
there is no practical difference between a software-based invention and a 
hardware-based invention.97  Although the specific legal question 
addressed by the court in Eolas is removed from the issue presented in this 
article, it is clear the Federal Circuit is comfortable treating software 
programs as apparatus-like under the patent laws.  Since there is little 
doubt that computer hardware is a patented article under the Marking 
Statute, it stands to reason that under the Eolas decision, courts should 
treat software in the same manner. 98
 
[39]  Similarly, the Federal Circuit, in Minton v. National Ass’n of 
Securities Dealers,99 held that the leasing of a program to a third party 
more than one year prior to the filing of an application on processes 
embodied within the program was contrary to the On-Sale Bar of the 
Patent Code.100  Here the court noted that there is a difference for the 
purposes of applying the On-Sale Bar to a tangible product and to a 
process,101 but nevertheless agreed with the lower court that the leasing of 
the computer program constituted a violation of the On-Sale Bar (thus 
holding the difference between a tangible product and a computer process 
inapposite in that context).102  By analogy to the Marking Requirement, it 
                                               
95 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2002);  Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 
F.3d 1325, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
96 Id. at 1338-1341. 
97 Id. at 1339 (“Hardware and software . . . are practically interchangeable in the field of 
computer technology.” (quoting Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 
972, 974 (N.D. Ill. 2003))). 
98 See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 806 F. Supp. 1294 (E.D. La. 1992). 
99 Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n. of Sec. Dealers, 336 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
100 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000 & Supp. 2002). 
101 Minton, 336 F.3d at 1378 (informing that there is a difference between the sale of a 
“tangible item” and “an invention that describes a series of steps in an invention”). 
102 Id.  
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seems that just as the Federal Circuit is willing to liken the lease of a 
program to being more akin to the sale of a tangible item than to the sale 
of a process; it would be willing to liken a program to a “patented article” 
under the Marking Statute. 
 
D. ANALOGY TO THE FALSE MARKETING STATUTE 
 
[40]  In Clontech Lab., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., the Federal Circuit dealt 
with issues pertaining to 35 U.S.C. § 292 (the “False Marking Statute”).103  
The False Marking Statute imposes penalties on those who falsely indicate 
that their product is covered by a patent or who produce and mark a 
product as patented without the permission of the patentee.104  In 
Clontech, the court explained that “Congress intended the public to rely on 
marking as a ‘ready means of discerning the status of intellectual property 
embodied in an article of manufacture or design.’”105  The purpose of the 
False Marking Statute is to punish those (i) who try to dupe the public 
either into believing that their product is covered by a patent when it is 
not; or (ii) who try to make the public believe that their “patented” product 
is somehow sanctioned by the patentee.106  In this sense, the underlying 
rationale of the False Marking Statute as to the first of the indicated 
purposes is not that different from that of the Marking Statute whose 
purpose has been said to be “aiding the public to identify whether an 
article is patented.”107   
 
[41]  Moreover, the court in Clontech implied that an unpatented product 
embodying or made using a patented process can be falsely marked where 
such a product is marked as being patented and produced without the 
permission of the patentee.108  By the same token, in the case of an article 
made with or embodying a patented process, it ought to be marked in 
                                               
103 Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
104 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2000) (creating a fine for up to $500 for each offense). 
105 Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1356 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 
489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989)).  
106 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2000). 
107 Nike, Inc. v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
108 Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1357 (“This is not a case where the cDNA library products were 
marked with language stating that the products were made by the ‘methods’ of any 
patents.  Rather, the record shows that the marking language included the statement: 
‘This product is the subject of U.S. Patent No. 5,668,005.’”). 
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accordance with the Marking Statute.109   It stands to reason that if there 
can be liability under the False Marking Statute for falsely marking an 
unprotected product that embodies process claims, liability must equally 
exist for a failure to properly mark the same product.110  In other words, if 
one can be punished for falsely marking a tangible unpatented process 
under the False Marking Statute,111 then liability ought to equally attach 
for not marking the same process pursuant to the Marking Statute112 if the 
process is actually covered by a patent. 
 
E. FEDERAL DISTRICT TEST FOR A “PATENTED ARTICLE” 
 
[42]  Several district court decisions have suggested a simple, axiomatic-
test for determining whether a “patented article” needs to conform to the 
requirements of the Marking Statute.  The test posits that a court should 
determine whether the product is such that if made by someone else other 
than the patentee or its licensee, it would create liability for 
infringement.113  Under such a test, software programs that embody one or 
more software patents will meet the definition of patented article and will 
thus require marking in accordance with the statute.114  This is true either 
where the software innovation is claimed as a series of process claims or 
the innovation is claimed as a mixture of process and apparatus claims. 
 
[43]  Even if this test proves inappropriate, it is clear that any software 
products that embody software patents that contain a mixture of both 
process and apparatus claims will be considered patented articles under the 
Marking Statute.  And if the test does prove inappropriate, it still remains 
                                               
109 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000). 
110 § 292. 
111 Id. 
112 § 287(a). 
113 Broadcom Corp. v. Agere Sys., Inc., No. 04-CIV-2416, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18163, 
at *9-11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2004) (refusing to dismiss on summary judgment a claim for 
damages owing to a failure to mark on the grounds that there existed factual uncertainty 
as to whether the products in question constituted patented articles); Clancy Sys. Int’l, 
Inc. v. Symbol Techs., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1170, 1173 (D. Colo. 1997) (“One test for 
determining whether a product is a ‘patented article’ under section 287(a) is to ask 
whether the product would infringe the patent if sold by an authorized party.” (quoting 
Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 806 F. Supp. 1294, 1296 (E.D. La. 1992))). 
114 Id. at *8, *11. 
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a question as to whether software products that embody only process 
claims could be considered “patented articles.”   
 
 
F. PURE PROCESS EXCEPTION MIGHT APPLY TO SOFTWARE PROGRAMS 
 
[44]  The strongest argument that software programs are exempt from the 
Marking Requirement is the notion that software patents are more akin to 
process claims and that, under “settled” Federal Circuit holdings, such 
process claims are exempt from the requirement of the Marking Statute.  
 
[45]  In Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., Inc.,115 the Federal Circuit 
noted that “the notice requirement of [the Marking Statute] does not apply 
where the patent is directed to a process or method.”116  In so holding, the 
court relied upon Wine Railway Appliance Co. v. Enterprise Railway 
Equipment Co., a much earlier Supreme Court pronouncement.117  
 
[46]  However, the question presented in Wine Railway dealt with a 
different issue.  In Wine Railway, Enterprise Railway Equipment 
Company (“Enterprise”) sued Wine Railway Appliance Co. (“Wine”) for 
patent infringement.118  The district court found that Wine had infringed a 
patent that had been assigned to Enterprise and was required to pay 
$18,002.83.119  The appellate court partially overturned the lower court 
and reduced the amount of the award to $12,512.06 representing the 
amount of damages that occurred after notice of infringement had been 
given.120  Under the appellate court’s analysis, Enterprise was only 
entitled to the damages that occurred after Wine had been placed on notice 
of the infringement of the patent at issue in the dispute.121  
 
[47]  In this case, Enterprise never produced any product that had been 
covered by the patent at issue.  Under the appellate court’s analysis this 
constituted a failure to mark, limiting damages to those that occurred after 
                                               
115 Bandag Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co. Inc., 704 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
116 Id. at 1581. 
117 Id. 
118 Ry. Equip. Co. v. Wine Ry. Appliance Co., 77 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1935). 
119 Wine Ry Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 392 (1936). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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the infringer had been placed on notice of the infringement by the 
patentee.122  The Supreme Court ruled that where a party holds a patent, 
but has never produced a product covered by the patent, the Marking 
Statute does not apply.123 Dicta within the opinion noted, as part of the 
Court’s overview of the cases applying the Marking Statute (as it existed 
at that time), that certain lower courts have held that the Marking 
Requirement “does not apply to a process patent, since the process is not 
susceptible of marking.”124
 
[48]  Bandag involved the use by Gerrard Tire Co., Inc. (“Gerrard”), of a 
system for retreading used tires that was covered by a patent owned by 
Bandag, Inc. (“Bandag”).125  On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court 
affirmed the holding of the lower district court with respect to Gerrard’s 
arguments relating to the Marking Requirement.  Gerrard argued it should 
not be held liable for damages relating its infringement prior to the point at 
which it was placed on notice by Bandag that it was infringing.126  
Additionally, Gerrard argued the Marking Statute applied to the patented 
Bandag process; therefore, Bandag’s failure to mark products produced 
under the process (a process which it used and licensed to franchisees), 
barred Bandag from recovery of full infringement damages.127  The 
Federal Circuit, concurring with the opinion of the lower court and relying 
on Wine Railway, stated it was “settled in the case law that the notice 
requirement of [the Marking Statute] does not apply where the patent is 
directed at a process or method.”128  
 
[49]  The same year that the Federal Circuit decided Bandag, it also 
decided Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area.129  Here, the Federal Circuit 
                                               
122 In other words, the question presented in Wine Railway was whether a party that had 
never produced the product upon which it held a patent was restricted by the Marking 
Statute in an infringement action against a party that did produce the product covered by 
the patent.  The lower courts had found that the failure to actually produce the product 
upon which it held the patent constituted a failure to mark under the Marking Statute.  Id. 
at 391-98. 
123 Id. at 398.   
124 Id. at 391. 
125 Bandag, 704 F.2d at 1581. 
126 Id. at 1580-81. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 1581. 
129 Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, 718 F.2d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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made the strongest statement that a machine merely utilizing a patented 
process is not a “patented article” under the Marking Statute.  In Hanson, 
the issue was over snow machines used by Alpine Valley Ski Area 
(“Alpine Valley”) that infringed Hanson’s patented method of snow-
making.130  Hanson had developed the method and had licensed it to a 
third-party, Snow Machines Incorporated (“SMI”), who produced 
machines that utilized Hanson’s method in order to make snow.  Hedco, 
Inc. (“Hedco”) sold machines to Alpine Valley utilizing the same 
method;131 however, Hedco did so without a proper license.132   
 
[50]  On appeal from a lower court verdict ordering Alpine Valley to pay 
damages to Hanson for infringement, Alpine Valley argued that, pursuant 
to the Marking Statute, damages should be limited to those which occurred 
after Alpine Valley had been placed on notice of the infringement as the 
machines produced by SMI were not properly marked.133  Noting that 
certain process claims of the Hanson patent had been found to be infringed 
by Alpine Valley’s use of the Hedco snow-making machines, the Federal 
Circuit concluded, keeping with the court’s recent pronouncement in 
Bandag, that any restriction on infringement damages imposed by the 
Marking Statute does not apply where the claims at issue are process 
claims.134   Thus, the court’s holding was highly supportive of the notion 
that the Marking Statute does not apply to machines that embody process 
claims, as opposed to being separately patented themselves as apparatus 
claims.  By analogy to the snow-machines in Hanson, it is arguable that 
software programs embodying patented processes, even where the same 
patent also contains claims directed to an apparatus that uses the 
processes, are not restricted by the Marking Statute. 
 
[51]  However, in American Medical Systems, the Federal Circuit pulled 
back from this simplistic standard that under no circumstances does the 
                                               
130 Id. at 1076. 
131 Id.  
132 Id. at 1076-77. 
133 Id. at 1082.  It appears that this issue was raised for the first time on appeal by Alpine 
Valley.  Additionally, it is unclear from the opinion as to whether Alpine asserted that the 
SMI machines were not properly marked or whether it asserted that Hanson failed to 
prove at trial that the machines were properly marked. 
134 Id. at 1083. 
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Marking Statute apply to claims directed at processes.135  Instead, the 
Federal Circuit held that:  
 
The purpose behind the [M]arking [S]tatute 
is to encourage the patentee to give notice to 
the public of the patent.  The reason that the 
[M]arking [S]tatute does not apply to 
method claims is that, ordinarily, where the 
patent claims are directed to only a method 
or process there is nothing to mark.  Where 
the patent contains both apparatus and 
method claims, however, to the extent that 
there is a tangible item to mark by which 
notice of the asserted method claims can be 
given, a party is obliged to do so if it intends 
to avail itself of the constructive notice 
provisions of section 287(a).136
[52]  Here, the court defines a different test for a patented article and, 
consequently, whether the Marking Statute applies. The test is not whether 
the claims deal with process claims, as indicated by the Bandag opinion, 
but rather, whether there exists a tangible article to mark.137   
 
G. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
[53]  Until such time as the Federal Circuit rules more specifically on this 
issue, it is unclear whether programs sold embodying software patents 
need to be marked in accordance with the Marking Statute.   What is clear, 
however, is that the policy arguments in favor of adopting an approach 
that includes defining patented software as a “patented article” under the 
Marking Statute are strong.  
 
[54]  The policies underlying the Marking Statute are best served by 
requiring patentees to mark software programs that embody patented 
                                               
135 Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
136 Id. at 1538-39 (emphasis added).    
137 Id. at 1539. 
 23
 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue1 
processes.138  A contrary view would permit patentees to circumvent the 
marking provisions by claiming only the use of processes, which is 
detrimental to the public interests that underlie the Marking Statute.139  
This concern is particularly relevant in the case of computer software 
because:  
 
[S]oftware can also be patented as a method. 
Under the present law, which exempts pure 
method patents [namely, patents that contain 
only method claims] from the marking 
requirements of section 287(a) entirely, the 
patent owner who sells software protected 
by a pure method patent would be under no 
obligation to mark the disk as patented. If 
the disk is not labeled as patented, persons 
who obtain copies of the disk may 
erroneously believe that the “invention” it 
contains is free for all the world to make, 
use, and sell. It only makes sense to require 
that the disk or magnetic tape on which the 
software resides be marked so as to put the 
world on notice that unauthorized copying 
and use of the software constitutes not only 
copyright infringement but patent 
infringement as well. This is equally true 
whether the software is protected by 
apparatus claims, method claims, or both. 
There is no reason that the marking  
requirement should not also extend to software 
patented under pure method claims. 140
 
 
 
                                               
138 See Joel Voelzke, Patent Marking Under 35 U.S.C. § 287(a): Products, Processes, 
and the Deception of the Public, 5 FED. CIR. B.J. 317, 338, 344 (1995). 
139 See Carl Oppedahl, Patent Marking of Systems, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 205, 221 (1995).  
140 Voelzke, supra note 137, at 338-39.
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V.  CONSEQUENCES OF APPLYING MARKING REQUIREMENT 
 TO SOFTWARE PATENTS 
 
[55]  For many companies, the implicit purpose of acquiring software 
patents is not for use as a weapon against those who may infringe, but 
rather as defensive ammunition to use against those who would accuse 
them of infringement.  For these companies, the benefit in a portfolio of 
software patents is to have strong currency with which to barter when 
others assert software patents against them.  For example, if a software 
company comes after Company A for patent infringement, Company A 
can use its large software patent portfolio to countersue, in the event that 
the suing company infringes one of Company A’s patents, or it can offer 
the suing company the right to license from its patent portfolio in 
exchange for a cross-license.   
 
[56]  However, even for defensive uses of software patents, the question of 
whether the Marking Statute applies is not academic.  Assuming, 
arguendo, that the Marking Requirement applies to software programs, if 
the patent holder has not adhered to the Marking Requirement, such a 
holder is limited to seeking injunctive relief forcing it to stop the 
continued sale of any infringing projects.  Nevertheless, a company that 
adheres to the requirement now has an arguably more effective deterrent:  
the ability to countersue for monetary damages.  A company would think 
twice about bringing an infringement lawsuit if there was a possibility that 
the company could be countersued for monetary damages, as opposed to 
mere injunctive relief.   
 
[57]  In the world of software, unlike, for example, biotechnology, it is 
often the case that there is an alternative non-patented method to achieve a 
similar result.  In the case where a company is enjoined from further 
infringing another’s software patent, it is not uncommon that the company 
will nevertheless be able to work around the patent.  An award of 
monetary damages, on the other hand, could be crippling to a company, 
especially in light of the fact that an infringer would potentially be liable 
for every copy of an infringing product sold.  Consequently, even for 
companies that wish to use their patents defensively, adherence to the 
Marking Requirement, where feasible, would likely strengthen their 
defensive position by providing the ability to countersue for monetary 
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damages, thus increasing the deterrent effect of their respective patent 
portfolios. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
[58]  There is substantial Federal Circuit precedent for the notion that 
programs that embody software patents must be considered a “patented 
article” under the Marking Statute.  The Eolas decision suggests that the 
Federal Circuit sees little difference between hardware-based inventions 
and software-based inventions.141  Similarly, the Minton decision indicates 
a willingness on the part of the Federal Circuit to liken programs to 
tangible goods.142  Taken separately or together, these opinions suggest 
that the Federal Circuit would likely consider a program embodying a 
software patent to be a “patented article” under the Marking Statute under 
one of two theories:  either because software should be treated similarly to 
hardware, which is clearly a patented article, or because, on balance, 
patented software has enough characteristics to qualify it as a product and, 
thus, a patented article.   
 
[59]  Even if the Federal Circuit is not swayed by these or similar 
arguments, at least two different federal district courts have suggested a 
test for the determination of whether something is a “patented article.”143  
This test, namely that an article is a patented article if, when made by 
another a party, the patent is infringed, if adopted by the Federal Circuit 
would firmly place programs into the category of being a patented article 
for the purpose of the Marking Statute.144
 
[60]  Finally, it is not clear that the early Federal Circuit Bandag-type 
pronouncements that infringement of pure process claims are outside the 
scope of the Marking Statute apply to software programs.  The appropriate 
standards seem to focus more on the existence of an object to mark, and, 
where there is no tangible product to mark, the Marking Requirement 
poses no bar to recovery.  With regard to software programs, given that 
there is something that can be marked, the likely conclusion should be that 
the Marking Requirement applies. 
                                               
141 Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
142 Minton v. Nat’l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, 336 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
143 See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. 
144 Id. 
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[61]  With the large proliferation in software patents in recent years, the 
potential for innocent infringement is growing exponentially.  It is 
protection against innocent infringement which is exactly what the 
Marking Requirement is supposed to cure. Not only should the Marking 
Statute apply to software programs, but existing precedent and logic 
dictate that such is the case.  Regardless, given the high stakes involved 
and the strong arguments in favor of applying the Marking Requirement to 
programs that embody software patents, until the Federal Circuit provides 
absolute clarity on this issue, companies that produce programs which 
they believe are covered by software patents should mark their products in 
conformity with the Marking Statute.  
 27
